Abstract. We propose a new algorithm to solve the Implicit Factorization Problem, which was introduced by May and Ritzenhofen at PKC'09. In 2011, Sarkar and Maitra (IEEE TIT 57(6): 4002-4013, 2011) improved May and Ritzenhofen's results by making use of the technique for solving multivariate approximate common divisors problem. In this paper, based on the observation that the desired root of the equations that derived by Sarkar and Maitra contains large prime factors, which are already determined by some known integers, we develop new techniques to acquire better bounds. We show that our attack is the best among all known attacks, and give experimental results to verify the correctness. Additionally, for the first time, we can experimentally handle the implicit factorization for the case of balanced RSA moduli.
Introduction
The RSA cryptosystem is the most widely used public-key cryptosystem in practice, and its security is closely related to the difficulty of Integer Factorization Problem (IFP): if IFP is solved then RSA is broken. It is conjectured that factoring cannot be solved in polynomial-time without quantum computers.
In Eurocrypt'85, Rivest and Shamir [20] first studied the factoring with known bits problem. They showed that N = pq (p, q is of the same bit size) can be factored given 2 3 -fraction of the bits of p. In 1996, Coppersmith [2] improved [20] 's bound to 1 2 . Note that for the above results, the unknown bits are within one consecutive block. The case of n blocks was later considered in [7, 15] .
Motivated by the cold boot attack [4] , in Crypto'09, Heninger and Shacham [6] considered the case of known bits are uniformly spread over the factors p and q, they presented a polynomial-time attack that works whenever a 0.59-fraction of the bits of p and q is given. As a follow-up work, Henecka et al. [5] focused on the attack scenario that allowed for error correction of secret factors, which
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called Noisy Factoring Problem. Later, Kunihiro et al. [12] discussed secret key recovery from noisy secret key sequences with both errors and erasures. Recently, Kunihiro and Honda [11] discussed how to recover RSA secret keys from noisy analog data.
Implicit Factorization Problem (IFP)
The above works require the knowledge of explicitly knowing bits of secret factor. In PKC'09, May and Ritzenhofen [18] introduced a new factoring problem with implicit information, called Implicit Factorization Problem (IFP). Consider that N 1 = p 1 q 1 , . . . , N k = p k q k be n-bit RSA moduli, where q 1 , . . . , q k are αn(α ∈ (0, 1))-bit primes: Given the implicit information that p 1 , . . . , p k share certain portions of bit pattern, under what condition is it possible to factorize N 1 , . . . , N k efficiently? This problem can be applied in the area of malicious generation of RSA moduli, i.e. the construction of backdoored RSA moduli. Besides, it also helps to understand the complexity of the underlying factorization problem better.
Since then, there have been many cryptanalysis results for this problem [18, 3, 23, 22, 14, 19, 21] . Sarkar and Maitra [22] developed a new approach, they used the idea of [10] , which is for the approximate common divisor problem (ACDP), to solve the IFP, and managed to improve the previous bounds significantly.
We now give a brief review of their method. Suppose that primes p 1 , . . . , p k share certain amount of most significant bits (MSBs). First, they notice that
Then they try to solve the simultaneous modular univariate linear equations
for some unknown divisor p 1 of known modulus N 1 . Note that if the root (u
is small enough, we can extract them efficiently. In [22] , Sarkar and Maitra proposed an algorithm to find the small root of equations (1) . Recently, Lu et al. [14] performed a more effective analysis by making use of Cohn and Heninger's algorithm [1] .
Our Contributions
In this paper, we present a new algorithm to obtain better bounds for solving the IFP. As far as we are aware, our attack is the best among all known attacks.
Technically, our algorithm is also to find a small root of Equations (1). Concretely, our improvement is based on the observation that for 2 ≤ i ≤ k, u (0) i contains a large prime q i , which is already determined by N i . 
γn-bit MSBs and βn-bit LSBs together case (γ + β > ·)
The symbol "-" means that this corresponding case has not been considered.
Therefore, we separate u i into two unknown variables x i and y i i.e. u i = x i y i . Consider the following equations
Then we introduce k − 1 new variables z i for the prime factor p i (2 ≤ i ≤ k), and use the equation x i z i = N i to decrease the determinant of the desired lattice. That is the key reason why we get better results than [22] .
In Fig 1, we give the comparison with previous bounds for the case k = 2. In Table 1 [18] , and tried to find the coordinate of the desired vector which is not included in the reduced basis, namely they introduced a method to deal with the case when the number of shared bits is not large enough to satisfy the bound in [18] .
In this paper, we also investigate Peng et al.'s method [19] . Surprisingly, we get the same result with a different method. In Sec 5, we give the experimental data for our two methods. [18] , SM Attack denotes Sarkar and Maitra's attack [22] , PHXHX Attack denotes Peng et al.'s attack [19] .
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. In Section 2, we review the necessary background for our approaches. In Section 3, based on new observations, we present our new analysis on the IFP. In Section 4, we revisit Peng et al.'s method [19] . Finally, in Sec 5, we give the experimental data for the comparison with previous methods.
Preliminaries

Notations
Three cases are considered in this paper, we list them below:
-p 1 , . . . , p k share βn LSBs where β ∈ (0, 1); -p 1 , . . . , p k share γn MSBs where γ ∈ (0, 1); -p 1 , . . . , p k share γn MSBs and βn LSBs together where γ ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1);
For simplicity, here we consider αn, βn and γn as integers.
Lattice
Consider a set of linearly independent vectors u 1 , . . . , u w ∈ Z n , with w n. The lattice L, spanned by {u 1 , . . . , u w }, is the set of all integer linear combinations of the vectors u 1 , . . . , u w . The number w of vectors is the dimension of the lattice. The set u 1 , . . . , u w is called a basis of L. In lattices with large dimension, finding the shortest vector is a very hard problem, however, approximations of a shortest vector can be obtained in polynomial-time by applying the well-known LLL basis reduction algorithm [13] .
Lemma 1 (LLL [13] ). Let L be a lattice of dimension w. In polynomial-time, the LLL algorithm outputs reduced basis vectors v i , 1 i w that satisfy
We also state a useful lemma from Howgrave-Graham [9] . Let g(
We define the norm of g by the Euclidean norm of its coefficient vector:
be an integer polynomial that consists of at most w monomials. Suppose that
Then g(y 1 , . . . , y k ) = 0 holds over the integers.
The approach we used in the rest of the paper relies on the following heuristic assumption [17, 7] for computing multivariate polynomials.
Assumption 1
The lattice-based construction in this work yields algebraically independent polynomials, this common roots of these polynomials can be computed using techniques like calculation of the resultants or finding a Gröbner basis.
Gaussian Heuristic. For a random n-dimensional lattice L in R n [8] , the length of the shortest vector λ 1 is expected to be approximately
In our attack, the low-dimensional lattice we constructed is not a random lattice, however, according to our practical experiments, the length of the first vector of the lattice basis outputted from the L 3 algorithm to that specific lattice is indeed asymptotically close to the Gaussian heuristic, similarly as the assumption says for random lattices. Moreover, the lengths of other vectors in the basis are also asymptotically close to the Gaussian heuristic. Hence, we can roughly estimate the sizes of the unknown coordinate of desired vector in the reduced basis.
Our New Analysis for Implicit Factorization
As described in the previous section, we will use the fact the desired common root of the target equations contains large prime factors q i (2 ≤ i ≤ k) which are already determined by N i to improve Sarkar-Maitra's results.
3.1 Analysis for Two RSA Moduli: the MSBs Case Theorem 1. Let N 1 = p 1 q 1 , N 2 = p 2 q 2 be two different n-bit RSA moduli with αn-bit q 1 , q 2 where α ∈ (0, 1). Suppose that p 1 , p 2 share γn MSBs where γ ∈ (0, 1). Then under Assumption 1, N 1 and N 2 can be factored in polynomial-time if
Then we want to recover q 2 , p 2 from N 1 , N 2 . We focus on a bivariate polynomial f (x, y) = N 2 + xy with the root (
In the following we will use the fact that the small root q 2 is already determined by N 2 to improve Sarkar-Maitra's results.
First let us introduce a new variable z for p 2 . We multiply the polynomial f (x, y) by a power z s for some s that has to be optimized. Additionally, we can replace every occurence of the monomial xz by N 2 . Define two integers m and t, let us look at the following collection of trivariate polynomials that all have the root (x 0 , y 0 ) modulo p t 1 .
For g k (x, y, z), we replace every occurrence of the monomial xz by N 2 because N 2 = p 2 q 2 . Therefore, every monomial
To keep the lattice determinant as small as possible, we try to eliminate the factor of N Compare to Sarkar-Maitra's lattice, the coefficient vectors g k (xX, yY, zZ) of our lattice contain less powers of X, which decreases the determinant of the lattice spanned by these vectors, however, on the other hand, the coefficient vectors contain powers of Z, which in turn increases the determinant. Hence, there is a trade-off and one has to optimize the parameter s subject to a minimization of the lattice determinant. That is the key reason why we can get better result than Sarkar-Maitra's results.
We have to find two short vectors in lattice L. Suppose that these two vectors are the coefficient vectors of two trivariate polynomial f 1 (xX, yY, zZ) and f 2 (xX, yY, zZ). These two polynomials have the root (q 2 , p 2 , p 2 ) over the integers. Then we can eliminate the variable z from these polynomials by setting z =
N2
x . Finally, we can extract the desired root (q 2 , p 2 ) from the new two polynomials if these polynomials are algebraically independent. Therefore, our attack relies on Assumption 1.
We are able to confirm Assumption 1 by various experiments later. This shows that our attack works very well in practice.
Now we give the details of the condition for which we can find two sufficiently short vectors in the lattice L. The determinant of the lattice L is
The dimension of the lattice is w = m + 1. To get two polynomials sharing the root q 2 , p 2 , p 2 , we get the condition
Substituting the values of the det(L) and neglecting low-order terms, we obtain the new condition
The optimized values of parameters τ and σ are given by
Plugging in this values, we finally end up with the condition
One can refer to Fig. 1 for the comparison with previous theoretical results.
Extension to k RSA Moduli
In this section, we give an analysis for k (k > 2) RSA moduli.
. . , q k where α ∈ (0, 1). Suppose that p 1 , . . . , p k share γn MSBs where γ ∈ (0, 1). Then under Assumption 1, N 1 , . . . , N k can be factored in polynomialtime if
k ) = (q 2 , p 2 , . . . , q k , p k ) modulo p 1 . Using a technique similar to that of Theorem 1, and introducing k − 1 new variables z i for p i (2 ≤ i ≤ k), we define the following collection of trivariate polynomials. 
To get 2k − 2 polynomials sharing the root q 2 , p 2 , p 2 , we get the condition 2 w(w−1)
Let t = τ m, s = σm, the optimized values of parameters τ and σ were given by
One can refer to Table 1 for the comparison with previous theoretical results.
Extension to the LSBs Case
In the following, we show a similar result in the case of p 1 , . . . , p k share some MSBs and LSBs together. This also takes care of the case when only LSBs are shared. 0, 1) ). Suppose that p 1 , · · · , p k share γn MSBs (γ ∈ (0, 1)) and βn LSBs (β ∈ (0, 1)) together. Then under Assumption 1, N 1 , · · · , N k can be factored in polynomial-time if
Proof. Suppose that p 1 , . . . , p k share γn MSBs and βn LSBs together. Then we have the following equations:
. . .
We can write as follows
Then we can construct a system of k − 1 polynomials
The rest of the proof follows s similar technique as in the proof of Theorem 2. We omit the details here.
Revisiting Peng et al.'s Method [19]
In [19] , Peng et al. gave a new idea for IFP. In this section, we revisit Peng et al.'s method and modify the construction of lattice which is used to solve the homogeneous linear modulo equation. Therefore, a further improved bound on the shared LSBs and MSBs is obtained.
Recall the method proposed by May and Ritzenhofen in [18] , the lower bound on the number of shared LSBs has been determined, which can ensure the vector (q 1 , · · · , q k ) is shortest in the lattice, namely the desired factorization can be obtained by lattice basis reduction algorithm.
Peng et al. took into consideration the lattice introduced in [18] and discussed a method which can deal with the case when the number of shared LSBs is not enough to ensure that the desired factorization can be solved by applying reduction algorithms to the lattice. More narrowly, since (q 1 , · · · , q k ) is in the lattice, it can be represented as a linear combination of reduced lattice basis. Hence the problem of finding (q 1 , · · · , q k ) is transformed into solving a homogeneous linear equation with unknown moduli. Peng et al. utilized the result from Herrmann and May [7] to solve the linear modulo equation and obtain a better result.
Firstly, we recall the case of primes shared LSBs. Assume that there are k different n-bit RSA moduli N 1 = p 1 q 1 , · · · , N k = p k q k , where p 1 , · · · , p k share γn LSBs and q 1 , · · · , q k are αn-bit primes. The moduli can be represented as
Furthermore, we can get following modular equations
In [18] , May and Ritzenhofen introduced a k-dimensional lattice L 1 which is generated by the row vectors of following matrix
Since (2) holds, the vector (q 1 , · · · , q k ) is the shortest vector in L 1 with a good probability when γ ≥ k k−1 α. Then by applying the LLL reduction algorithm to the lattice, the vector (q 1 , · · · , q k ) can be solved. Conversely, when γ < k k−1 α the reduced basis (λ 1 , · · · , λ k ) doesn't contain vector (q 1 , · · · , q k ), nevertheless, we can represent the vector (q 1 , · · · , q k ) as a linear combination of reduced basis. Namely, there exist integers
Moreover, the following system of modular equations can be obtained,
where
Based on the experiments, the size of the reduced basis can be roughly estimated as Gaussian heuristic. We estimate the length of λ i and the size of l ij as det(L 2 )
. Then using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, from (3) we can get the following homogeneous modular equation
where a i is an integer satisfying a i ≡ l ij mod N j for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and it can be calculated from the l ij and N j . For this linear modular equation, Peng et al. directly utilized the method of Herrmann and May [7] to solve it and obtain that when
the desired solution can be solved.
In this paper, we notice that the linear modular equation is homogeneous which is a variant of Herrmann and May's equation, hence we utilize the following theorem which is proposed by Lu et al. in [16] to modify the construction of lattice used in [19] . Theorem 4. Let N be a sufficiently large composite integer (of unknown factorization) with a divisor p (p ≥ N β ). Furthermore, let f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ Z[x 1 , . . . , x n ] be a homogenous linear polynomial in n(n ≥ 2) variables. Under Assumption 1, we can find all the solutions (y 1 , . . . , y n ) of the equation f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 0 (mod p) with gcd(y 1 , . . . , y n ) = 1,
The running time of the algorithm is polynomial in log N but exponential in n.
For this homogeneous linear equation (4) in k variables modulo
by Theorem 4 with the variables
Hence, when
the desired vector can be found out.
The above result can be easily extend to MSBs case using the technique in [19] . Surprisingly we get the same result as Theorem 2 by modifying Peng et al.'s technique.
Experimental Results
We implemented our analysis in Magma 2.20 computer algebra system on a PC with Intel(R) Core(TM) Duo CPU(2.80GHz, 2.16GB RAM Windows 7). Table 2 . Theoretical and Experimental data of the number of shared MSBs in [22] and shared MSBs in Our Method in Sec. 3 k bitsize of (pi, qi), i.e., ((1 − α)log 2 Ni, αlog 2 Ni)
No. of shared MSBs in pi [22] No. of shared MSBs in pi (Sec. 3) theo. expt. dim time of L are several vectors that satisfy Howgrave-Graham's bound. Moreover, the more integer equations corresponding to the vectors we choose, the less time calculating Gröbner basis. For an instance, when k = 3, (m, t, s) = (13, 9, 4) and the bitlengths of p and q are both 512-bits, we constructed a 105-dimensional lattice and by applying the L 3 algorithm to the lattice, we successfully collected 74 polynomial equations which share desired roots over the integers when q 1 , q 2 , q 3 shared 460 MSBs. When we chose all of integer equations, the calculation of Gröbner basis took 12.839 seconds.
Meanwhile our method of Sec. 4 is based on an improved method of [19] , we present some numerical values for comparison with these two methods in Table 3 . As it is shown, by using an improved method to solve the homogeneous equations, we obtained an improved bound on the numbers of shared bits and the experiments also showed this improvement. For a fixed dimension of lattice, similarly since entries of our constructed lattice is decided by m and t, the running time of LLL algorithm increases when t increases.
Note that the running time of the method of Sec. 3 is faster than the method of Sec. 4 when p and q get more balanced, especially for balanced moduli. For the unbalanced case, the method of Sec. 4 is faster.
